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Many scholars now argue that the Treaty of Lisbon has removed the role and influence 
of the rotating Council Presidency in the domain of the European Union’s foreign affairs. 
This paper will, however, go beyond a superficial, treaty-based analysis of the influence 
of the post-Lisbon rotating Council Presidency and instead look at two primary, residual, 
informal Presidential roles, namely agenda-shaping and brokering. It will examine the 
extent to which these informal roles allowed the Polish and Lithuanian Council 
Presidencies of July to December 2011 and 2013 respectively to influence the 
development of the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the Eastern Partnership. 
The paper will argue that the considerable influence of these rotating Presidencies 
defied the logic of the Lisbon Treaty, suggesting that the ‘golden age’ of this six-month 
position, whereby individual Member States pursue foreign policy issues of significant 






Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon it was widely acknowledged by scholars and practitioners 
alike that the country holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union1 had an “opportunity to advance particular national interests” at the European 
level.2 This ability to bring domestic policy priorities to the forefront of EU decision-making 
has been particularly apparent in the area of foreign affairs. For example, in 1999 
Finland launched the ‘Northern Dimension’ to engage more actively with Russia and the 
Baltic region;3 in 2002 the Spanish Presidency strengthened Euro-Mediterranean and 
Euro-Latin America relations;4 and in 2001 Sweden prioritised EU enlargement.5 
Since December 2009 however, and the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
rotating Presidency in EU external affairs has become, according to Piotr Maciej 
Kaczyński, “politically irrelevant”. 6  Despite this apparent removal of the role of the 
rotating Presidency from EU external affairs, Member States in the post-Lisbon era have 
continued to place domestic foreign policy priorities on the EU agenda during their six-
month Presidencies. Two prime examples are the Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies, 
which ran from 1 July to 31 December 2011 and 2013 respectively. In spite of their 
different country characteristics, 7 both countries specifically identified the European 
Union’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme, under which relations with Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine are conducted, as a priority for their 
                                                 
1 Hereafter, the terms “rotating Council Presidency”, “rotating Presidency”, “Council Presidency”, 
and “Presidency” will be used.  
2 Ole Elgström, “Introduction”, in Ole Elgström (ed.), European Union Council Presidencies: A 
comparative perspective, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 1. 
3 Jonas Tallberg, Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, pp. 90-101. 
4 Francesc Morata and Ana-Mar Fernández, “The Spanish Presidencies of 1989, 1995, and 2002: 
from commitment to reluctance towards European integration”, in Ole Elgström (ed.), European 
Union Council Presidencies: A comparative perspective, London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 185-186. 
5 “Policy issues”, The Swedish Presidency website, 5 June 2001. 
6 Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, “General Performance of the Polish Presidency”, Lithuanian Foreign 
Policy Review, no. 28, 2012, p. 117. 
7  Whilst similarly located geographically and sharing the same accession date, Lithuania is 
territorially much smaller than Poland with a much smaller population, GDP, government budget, 
and foreign trade statistics (see “Poland vs. Lithuania”, Index Mundi, January 2014). In addition, 
Lithuania is considered by scholars to be a ‘small state’ with a ‘small state’ mind-set whereas 
Poland is not (see, above all, Simone Bunse, Small States and EU Governance: Leadership 
through the Council Presidency, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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respective Presidencies.8 Indeed, it was Poland, alongside Sweden, who first presented 
the idea of the Eastern Partnership to the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations 
Council on 26 May 2008.9 According to Margarita Šešelgytė, the EaP has been on 
Lithuania’s foreign policy priority list “since the country’s accession to the EU [where it] 
aspired to a special responsibility” in the region.10 For Poland and Lithuania, therefore, 
the Eastern Partnership reflects both a significant domestic priority and a programme of 
special interest on the European Union’s external relations agenda. Thus, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that both countries would identify the EaP as a policy priority for what was 
their first experience as holders of the Council Presidency. In fact, the development of 
the Eastern Partnership as an EU policy has, since its creation, been explicitly linked to 
the role of the rotating Council Presidency. The Poles approached Sweden to co-initiate 
the EaP as the Swedes were “about to take over the rotating Presidency of the EU”, 
whilst all three EaP summits to date have taken place under the Presidencies of Central 
and Eastern European Member States.11 The role of the rotating Council Presidency in 
the development of the EaP appears, therefore, to be significant. Considering on the 
one hand that the Treaty of Lisbon appears to have removed the role of the rotating 
Council Presidency in EU external relations, and on the other the importance of the EaP 
dossier to the respective national administrations of Poland and Lithuania, this begs the 
question as to whether these Council Presidencies were able to influence the 
development of the Eastern Partnership during their respective six-month periods; and if 
so, how?  
Having defined the key terms and methodology, the second section will identify 
agenda-shaping and brokering as the two significant informal roles available to a post-
Lisbon Council Presidency, and will outline the three pre-requisites that are required for a 
Presidency to use such roles to its advantage. Subsequently, I will argue that both the 
Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies were able to use these residual roles for the 
                                                 
8 Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, Programme of the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, Vilnius, 2013, pp. 9-10; Council of the European Union, “The future Irish, 
Lithuanian and Greek Presidencies: 18 month programme of the Council (1 January 2013 – 30 
June 2014)”, 17426/12, Brussels, 7 December 2012, pp. 14, 23, 55, 73-74; Council of the European 
Union, “The future Polish, Danish and Cypriot Presidencies: 18 month programme of the Council 
(1 July 2011 – 31 December 2012)”, 11447/11, Brussels, 17 June 2011, p. 14; Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, 
“Polish Council Presidency 2011: Ambitions and Limitations”, SIEPS, no. 3, Stockholm, 2011, p. 38. 
9 Nathaniel Copsey and Karolina Pomorska, “The Influence of Newer Member States in the 
European Union: The Case of Poland and the Eastern Partnership”, Europe-Asia Studies, 2013, p. 
425. 
10 Margarita Šešelgytė, “The First Leadership Test: What to Expect from the Lithuanian Presidency 
of the EU”, SIEPS, European Policy Analysis, August 2013, p. 9. 
11 Copsey and Pomorska, op.cit., p. 425. 
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Presidency to significantly influence the development of the Eastern Partnership across 
three separate tracks: bilateral, multilateral, and internal. The fourth section compares 
the influence of the two Presidencies and assesses the implications of the analysis. The 
final section recommends how the post-Lisbon role of the Council Presidency can best 
be utilised for the benefit of the EU and for the Member States, before briefly 
summarising the paper’s findings. 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this paper, I define ‘development’ as the way in which a policy or 
programme - in this case the Eastern Partnership - has evolved since its creation. Thus, 
the ‘development of the Eastern Partnership’ refers to the deliverables and outcomes 
for the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the EaP during the six-month periods 
of the respective Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies. Consequently, the paper will 
concentrate on the way in which the Eastern Partnership currently appears, regardless 
of whether these developments have been successful, advisable or binding. 
Following Vandecasteele et al., I define ‘influence’ as “intentionally changing an 
outcome from what it would have been in the absence of an action”.12 Influence, thus, 
is seen as an intentional process based on the actions of an agent, in this case the 
rotating Council Presidency. This paper will adapt the indicators for measuring influence 
developed by Vandecasteele et al. in order to assess the residual roles of the Polish and 
Lithuanian rotating Council Presidencies (agenda-shaping and brokering) on the 
development of the EaP.13 
As such, the influence of agenda-shaping and brokering will be assessed in terms of 
‘goal achievement’ and ‘ascription’. Goal achievement refers to “how much of the 
[Presidency’s] goals are reflected in the outcome”, while ascription refers to “the 
contribution of the [Presidency] to the outcome in relation to the contribution of other 
actors”.14 Vandecasteele et al. also use ‘political relevance’, that is, “how politically 
                                                 
12 Bruno Vandecasteele, Fabienne Bossuyt and Jan Orbie, “Unpacking the influence of the 
Council Presidency on European Union external policies: The Polish Council Presidency and the 
Eastern Partnership”, European Integration online Papers, Special Issue 1, vol.17, 2013, p. 5. 
13 Taking into account the existing research (see, for example, Erika Márta Szabó, Background 
vocals: The role of the rotating Presidency in the EU’s external relations post-Lisbon, Master’s 
thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2011, p.4.) and the testimony of interviews conducted within 
the framework of this study, it would appear that the roles of agenda-shaping and brokering – 
which will be defined fully in the second section – are the primary roles still associated with the 
position of the rotating Council Presidency. Other residual roles, including but not limited to 
business manager, administrator, promoter of initiatives, liaison point, political leader, 
spokesperson, or collective representative may still remain, but are less apparent. 
14 Vandecasteele, Bossuyt and Orbie, op.cit., p.5. 
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important and binding the outcome is” as a measure of influence; however, I consider 
this measure to be irrelevant to this paper.15 The reason for this lies in the definition of the 
word ‘development’, whereby the paper will look at the overall way in which the 
Eastern Partnership has evolved since its creation rather than whether this evolution has 
been successful, advisable, or politically binding. The indicators for Presidency influence 
through ‘agenda-shaping’ or ‘brokering’ are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Indicators for Presidency influence  










None The outcome entirely contradicts the Presidency’s 
preferences. 
Limited The outcome partially corresponds to and partially contradicts 
the Presidency’s preferences. 
Substantial The outcome is not the most preferred result for the 
Presidency, but does not contradict its preferences. 
High The outcome reflects the Presidency’s preferences as much as 






None The Presidency was not involved in developing the outcome. 
Limited The outcome was mainly developed by other actors, with the 
Presidency involved to a limited extent. 
Substantial The Presidency steered the outcome, but other actors also 
played a role in developing the outcome. 
High It is unlikely that the outcome would have been the same if it 
had not been for the involvement of the Presidency. 
Source: Based on Vandecasteele et al., op.cit., p. 7. 
The overall degree of influence of the rotating Council Presidency through a given 
mechanism (agenda-shaping or brokering) in a given track of the Eastern Partnership 
(bilateral, multilateral, internal) will therefore be established by taking an average of all 
outcomes within a single track. Following Vandecasteele et al., the paper avoids 
numerical values to measure influence so as “to avoid creating the impression that 
influence is quantified or measured on an interval scale”.16 The judgement of the author 
in each case therefore remains solely based on qualitative reasoning. 





Influencing an EU foreign policy priority as a post-Lisbon Presidency 
As noted by Kaczyński, “the domain of external relations and foreign policy is, arguably, 
among the most affected by the [Lisbon] Treaty”.17 In theory, certainly, the formal role of 
the rotating Presidency in EU external affairs has been ceded to the President of the 
European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), and the officials of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). It is the President of the European Council 
rather than the Head of State or Government of the country holding the rotating 
Presidency who “ensure[s] the external representation of the Union on issues concerning 
its common foreign and security policy [CFSP]”;18 the HR/VP rather than the national 
Foreign Minister who conducts the Union’s CFSP, represents the Union abroad and in 
international organisations, and chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (minus the Trade 
configuration);19 and it is EEAS officials who now chair meetings at all levels of CFSP, with 
the exception of COREPER II, but including the Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
and all geographic Council preparatory bodies such as the Council Working Party on 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST).20 Scholars have predicted that “the post-
Lisbon regime will reduce the rotating Presidency’s ability to pursue its priorities in the 
field of external relations”, and that it now occupies merely a facilitating or supporting 
role.21 As Martin Westlake posits, however, “a mere reading of the Treaty would reveal 
only a little about the Presidency’s […] functions”; the informal roles and mechanisms of 
the Presidency have been equally important in enabling it to pursue policy priorities 
during its six-months at the helm.22 It is therefore important to assess to what extent the 
rotating Presidency has retained its informal roles in the post-Lisbon era. 
                                                 
17 Joint Study of European Policy Centre & Egmont & Centre for European Policy Studies, The 
Treaty of Lisbon: A Second Look at the Institutional Innovations, Brussels, CEPS, Egmont, and EPC, 
September 2010, p. 141 [hereafter, “EPC, Egmont & CEPS”]. 
18 European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C115, 9 May 2008, Art.15 TEU [hereafter, “Lisbon”]. 
19 European Union, “Lisbon”, op.cit., Art.27(2) TEU. 
20 Ibid., Art.27(3) TEU; ISIS Europe, “The impact of the Lisbon Treaty on CFSP and ESDP”, European 
Security Review, no. 37, March 2008, p. 2. 
21 Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, “What is Left for the Rotating Council Presidency under the Lisbon 
Rules?”, in Elvire Fabry (ed.), The contribution of 16 European think tanks to the Polish, Danish and 
Cypriot EU Trio Presidency, Paris, Notre Europe, June 2011, p. 340; Margarita Šešelgyté, “The 
Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council and Common Security and Defense Policy: Opportunities 
and Challenges”, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, vol. 10, no. 1, January 2012, p. 100. 
22 Martin Westlake, The Council of the European Union, 2nd edition, London, John Harper, 1999, p. 
50. 
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Informal roles of the Presidency: agenda-shaping and brokering from pre- to post-Lisbon 
‘Agenda-shaping’ and ‘brokering’ are not formally attributed to the rotating Council 
Presidency in the Treaty of Lisbon, nor were they in preceding Treaties. It is these 
mechanisms, defined below, that will form the basis for a subsequent evaluation of how 
and to what extent the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies influenced the 
development of the Eastern Partnership. 
Whilst the Treaties have never delegated specific formal powers to the Presidency to 
shape the agenda, that is, “to initiate proposals for new EU policy, to structure the 
agenda according to its own liking, or to exclude issues it does not consider worthy of 
consideration”, it has nonetheless been able to do so.23 Tallberg’s evidence for such a 
claim is largely linked to the Presidency as holder of the chair, which, as has been noted 
above, is no longer necessarily the case post-Lisbon. With regard to brokering, whilst 
many argue that a Presidency should be “a neutral mediator, an ‘honest broker’”, I 
argue that holding the Presidency allows the Member State at the helm to seek 
“efficient and favourable outcomes” through brokering (without the ‘honest’ prefix).24 
Indeed, this argument is well supported in the literature, where it is claimed that 
“mediators usually have a stake in the conflict they try to resolve and [therefore] 
complete altruism is rare”.25 As Elgström astutely notes, as an “insider mediator […] the 
Presidency is by definition one of the negotiating actors [and] therefore neutrality (‘no 
stake in the outcome’) is seldom an option”.26 
Pre-requisites for using Presidential mechanisms of influence 
Whilst agenda-shaping and brokering are still available to the rotating Council 
Presidency even in the post-Lisbon era, the ability to use such mechanisms effectively, 
however, is far from inevitable. In fact, the ability of Poland and Lithuania to influence 
successfully the development of the Eastern Partnership through agenda-shaping and 
brokering rests on the fulfilment of three criteria, which will be outlined briefly below. In 
addition, it should again be noted that it is for the Member State holding the Presidency 
                                                 
23 Jonas Tallberg, “The agenda-shaping powers of the Council Presidency”, in Ole Elgström (ed.), 
European Union Council Presidencies: A comparative perspective, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 
22. 
24 European Union, Handbook of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Brussels, 
November 2011, p. 10; David Metcalfe, “Leadership in European Union negotiations: The 
Presidency of the Council”, International Negotiation, vol. 3, p. 421. 
25 Ole Elgström, “The honest broker? The Council Presidency as a mediator”, in Ole Elgström (ed.), 
European Union Council Presidencies: A comparative perspective, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 
41. 
26 Ibid., p. 44. 
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to choose for itself what type of Presidency it wants to conduct. Already in the post-
Lisbon era, scholars have noted a difference between ‘passive’ Presidencies, whereby 
leadership and influence are left largely to the post-Lisbon EU actors or other Member 
States, and ‘national’ Presidencies, whereby influence on EU policies is deliberately 
pursued. 27 It is these so-called ‘national’ Presidencies, as those of both Poland and 
Lithuania can be characterised, which therefore must fulfil the following pre-requisites. 
Firstly, a Member State that seeks to influence the development of a domestic policy 
priority on the European level during its six-month Presidency must accept to a certain 
extent its new role as defined by the Lisbon Treaty and the relevant Council decisions. 
The Presidency is a service in the interest of all of the European Union, and its primary 
duty in foreign affairs is to support the HR/VP and the EEAS in their work.28 Without 
accepting this new role and the position of the Presidency in relation to the EEAS, HR/VP, 
and the President of the European Council in the post-Lisbon hierarchy, the Presidency 
runs the risk of souring relationships with actors with whom it is forced to work with for six 
months. Lithuania and indeed even Poland, which in the literature had been labelled as 
a highly ambitious Presidency,29 both visibly accepted the formally reduced role of the 
Presidency and so, in theory, were in a position to use their informal roles to influence the 
development of the Eastern Partnership during their respective six months at the helm.30  
Secondly, significant thought must be put into the Member States’ Presidential 
programme. It is extremely important that a Member State does not focus on just one 
issue during its Presidency, as this can lead to the country in question being negatively 
labelled as having a hobbyhorse and thus can create resentment within the Council.31 
                                                 
27 Ibid.; Šešelgyté, “The Lithuanian Presidency of the EU Council and Common Security and 
Defense Policy: Opportunities and Challenges”, op.cit., p. 100. 
28 Interview with an official of the European Union institutions 1, via telephone, 14 March 2014 
[hereafter, “Interview 15”]; Interview with an official, Foreign Ministry of a European Union 
Member State, via telephone, 7 April 2014 [hereafter, “Interview 8”]; Interview with an official, 
European Union Member State Permanent Representation to the European Union, Brussels, 27 
March 2014 [hereafter, “Interview 6”]; Interview with a senior official, European Union Member 
State Permanent Representation to the European Union, Brussels, 8 April 2014 [hereafter, 
“Interview 5”]; Interview with an official of the European Union institutions, Brussels, 17 February 
2014 [hereafter, “Interview 9”]; Interview with an official of the European Union institutions 1, via 
telephone, 14 March 2014 [hereafter, Interview 14”]; Interview with an official, European Union 
Member State Permanent Representation to the European Union, via telephone, 2 April 2014 
[hereafter, “Interview 7”]; Interviews 2 and 3, op.cit. 
29 Kaczyński, “Polish Council Presidency 2011”, op.cit., pp. 44, 49; Mikołaj Dowgielewicz, “External 
Challenges for the Polish Presidency in the Council of the EU”, Yearbook of Polish European 
Studies, vol. 13, 2010, pp. 15-16. 
30 Interview with an official of the European Union institutions, Brussels, 5 March 2014 [hereafter, 
“Interview 12”]; Interview with an official of the European Union institutions 2, Brussels, 3 March 
2014 [hereafter, “Interview 11”]; Interviews 1, 5-7, 9, and 10, op.cit.  
31 Interviews 6, 7, 9, and 15, op.cit. 
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Indeed, as Vaidotas Verba notes, “if you pursue only your own national priorities you 
won’t win many friends”.32 Ultimately, Member States still accept that Presidencies will 
identify a range of priorities that have the interest of that particular country at heart, 
even in external relations, as they too will want to employ such tactics in the future.33 
Nevertheless, if a Presidency is looking to make progress on a specific issue from within its 
range of policy priorities, it is important that this dossier meets two additional criteria. 
Firstly, it must be presented as being in the general interest of the European Union. Both 
Poland and Lithuania sought to convince Member States that the more interconnected 
the Union is with the Eastern neighbourhood, the more stable and the more prosperous 
everyone becomes.34 Highlighting the importance of a developed relationship with the 
Eastern partners for European security, energy security, and for the promotion of EU 
common values took the emphasis away from Presidency-specific relations.35 Secondly, 
the issue must have support from other Member States and, crucially, the EEAS. Both 
Presidencies carefully selected the EaP as a priority policy after having consulted with 
their allies in the Council: with the Visegrád countries, the Baltic states, the Scandinavian 
states, and with Germany.36 Furthermore, the EaP, with its support from the HR/VP down 
to the EEAS officials, and from Commissioner Füle down to the sectoral working parties, 
clearly fits into the EU’s own objectives. 37 Having met both of the aforementioned 
criteria, the Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies were then potentially able to use the 
residual agenda-shaping and brokering roles to develop all three tracks of the EaP. 
Finally, a Presidency needs to be well prepared for the six-month period in question. 
Indeed, thorough preparation and strategic thinking is recognised as a way of ensuring 
that a Presidency runs smoothly and that any unforeseen challenges that arise can be 
dealt with as efficiently and effectively as possible. 38  In hindsight, such challenges 
included the economic crisis, the arrest of Yulia Tymoshenko, and fallout from the ‘Arab 
                                                 
32 Interview with H.E. Mr. Vaidotas Verba, Ambassador, Special Envoy for the Eastern Partnership, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, via telephone, 18 February 2014 [hereafter, “Interview 1”]. 
33 Interviews 6-8, op.cit.; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books, 
1984, pp. 126-129. 
34 Irene Hahn-Fuhr and Kai-Olaf Lang, “Ambitious realism: The Eastern Partnership as a top priority 
of the Polish EU Presidency”, in Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski, Thomas Mehlhausen and Monika Sus 
(eds.), Poland’s EU-Council Presidency under Evaluation: Navigating Europe through Stormy 
Waters, Wroclaw, Nomos, January 2014, p. 69; Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, op.cit., pp. 16-17. 
35 Interviews 1, 5, 6, 8, 10, and 15, op.cit.; Hahn-Fuhr and Lang, op.cit. 
36 Interviews 1,5, 6, 8, 10 and 15. 
37 Conversation with Mr. David O’Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer EEAS, Bruges, 18 March 2014; 
Interviews 3, 6, and 8, op.cit. 
38 Vanhoonacker, Pomorska and Maurer, op.cit., p. 24; Piotr Maciej Kaczyński, “How to assess a 
rotating presidency of the Council under new Lisbon rules: The case of Hungary”, CEPS Policy 
Brief, no. 232, 2011, p. 3; Interviews 1, 5, 6, 8, 10-12, and 15, op.cit. 
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Spring’ in the case of Poland; and in the case of Lithuania the Armenian and Ukrainian 
refusals to initial and sign their respective Association Agreements with the EU at the 
Vilnius Summit in November 2013.39 Both Poland and Lithuania created new positions for 
their Presidencies: Mikołaj Dowgielewicz was appointed Government Plenipotentiary for 
the Preparation of Administrative Agencies and Poland’s Presidency of the Council of 
the EU; while Vaidotas Verba was appointed Lithuanian Ambassador, Special Envoy for 
the Eastern Partnership and Chief Coordinator for the preparations of the Eastern 
Partnership Vilnius Summit in the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.40 In addition, both 
countries took care to deliver training for staff in Brussels and in the national capitals, 
which was especially vital given that both Poland and Lithuania lacked the experience 
of having previously conducted a Presidency.41 Lithuanian representatives in Brussels 
benefitted from at least four years of experience, during which time they had witnessed 
at first hand different types of Presidencies, including that of Poland, which weighed 
heavily on how they approached their own six-month period. 42  Both Poland and 
Lithuania prepared effectively and thoroughly for their respective Presidencies, and thus 
were able to utilise agenda-shaping and brokering as informal mechanisms of influence. 
The influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies on the development of 
the Eastern Partnership 
This section will assess the extent to which the aforementioned residual roles enabled 
the Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies to influence the development of each of the 
three tracks of the Eastern Partnership (bilateral, multilateral, and internal). By separating 
the two roles and by analysing the three tracks individually, it will be possible to take 
note of any specific trends that appear.  
Bilateral track 
The bilateral track of the Eastern Partnership refers to the deepening of relations 
between the EU and the EaP countries on an individual basis. The EU bilaterally supports 
reforms in three main areas: “good governance; rule of law and fundamental freedoms; 
and sustainable economic and social development, and trade and investment”. 43 
                                                 
39 Kaczyński, “Polish Council Presidency 2011”, op.cit., pp. 46-47; Kaczyński, “How to assess a 
rotating presidency of the Council under new Lisbon rules”, op.cit., p.  3; Interviews 1, 5-7, 10, 11 
and 15, op.cit. 
40 Kaczyński, “Polish Council Presidency 2011”, op.cit., p. 33; Interview 1, op.cit. 
41 Interviews 6 and 8, op.cit. 
42 Interviews 1, 5, 6, 9, and 12, op.cit. 
43  “EU cooperation with eastern neighbours in the framework of the Eastern Partnership”, 
European Commission Development and Cooperation Aid, 11 March 2014. 
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Deliverables to date have included Association Agreements (AA), Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), agreements on visa facilitation and 
liberalisation, and technical and financial assistance in a number of individual fields.44 
Agenda-shaping 
In the EU’s bilateral visa policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively, the Polish 
Presidency exerted high levels of influence. Having pressured the Commission “to 
propose starting negotiations with both countries on visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements”, the Polish Ambassador to the EU Jan Tombiński then “immediately 
initiated discussions at COREPER”.45 By using agenda-structuring capabilities to prioritise 
the issue on the COREPER agenda, Tombiński was able to ensure that the Council 
adopted the negotiation mandates in December 2011.46 Indeed, this agenda-shaping 
influence eventually led to EU Visa Facilitation Agreements being signed with Armenia in 
December 2012 and with Azerbaijan in November 2013 at the Vilnius Summit.47 This 
outcome fully reflected the goals of the Polish Presidency and thus we can observe that 
the level of goal achievement was high. The level of ascription to the Presidency was 
also high, as Polish intervention led both the Commission proposal for a mandate and 
the adoption of the mandate by the Council to be “earlier than was planned”.48 
Poland also used its ability to shape the agenda to maintain bilateral relations with 
Ukraine during the arrest and trial of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. 
With the EU making progress on the Association Agreement and DCFTA dependent on 
Tymoshenko’s acquittal, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski used his right to chair 
the Gymnich meeting in September 2011 to put the issue of relations with Ukraine on the 
agenda, as did Tombiński on a continual basis in COREPER.49 These actions were crucial 
in keeping the dialogue between the EU and Ukraine alive and the AA on the EU’s 
agenda.50 We can assess, therefore, that whilst the Polish Presidency did not make as 
much progress with the Ukrainian AA as it had hoped to during its Presidency, its 
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agenda-shaping capabilities were crucial in maintaining momentum of some kind. Thus, 
goal achievement is limited and ascription in this instance is high. 
The prime example of the Lithuanian Presidency influencing the development of the 
EaP’s bilateral track through agenda-shaping was at its final COREPER II meeting, when 
a Visa Liberalisation Agreement with Moldova was reached.51 It was an objective of 
both the Lithuanian Presidency and the Moldovan authorities to reach such an 
agreement before the turn of the year for two reasons: firstly, to provide a timetable that 
could accommodate the necessary legislative procedure of the European Union and 
the complications posed by the European Parliament elections; and secondly, so that 
the agreement would be in place prior to the 2014 summer holiday season, therefore 
benefitting both Moldovan citizens and, it was hoped, the ruling Pro-European Coalition 
in the Moldovan parliament ahead of the national elections in November 2014.52 In 
hindsight, Ambassador Karoblis putting the agreement on the agenda in December 
2013 has subsequently allowed both the European Parliament and the Council to pass 
the legislation on 27 February and 14 March 2014 respectively.53 Indeed, the way in 
which the Lithuanian Presidency combined progress on the Moldovan dossier with that 
of similar agreements on visa-free travel for many other third countries during its six-
month period, including Peru, Colombia, Morocco, and sixteen Caribbean and Pacific 
countries, was instrumental in persuading Member States such as Spain and France to 
sign off on the Moldovan agreement. 54 Evidently, as has been mentioned previously, a 
Presidency in the post-Lisbon era can directly influence a policy outcome through 
agenda-shaping, especially when there is a careful packaging of deals and when the 
Presidency does not ignore issues that are important to other Member States solely in 
order to pursue its own priorities. We can note here, therefore, that levels of both goal 
achievement and ascription to the Presidency are high; Lithuania’s influence in the 
development of Moldovan visa liberalisation is of significant importance. 
Added to this example is the development of the Eastern European Energy Efficiency 
and Environment Partnership (E5P), which was expanded to include not only Ukraine but 
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also Armenia, Georgia and Moldova under the Lithuanian Presidency.55 In this instance, 
whilst Lithuania successfully developed this mechanism with a view to expanding 
bilateral cooperation with the EaP countries in the fields of energy efficiency and 
environment cooperation (high goal achievement), the reliance on significant 
donations from third countries including the United States, Norway, and Iceland dilutes 
the level of ascription (limited) to the Presidency.56 
Bar the limited ascription to the Lithuanian Presidency in the case of developing the E5P, 
and the limited goal achievement in the case of the Polish Presidency's attempts to 
maintain momentum in the EU's bilateral relations with Ukraine, all other examples cited 
above demonstrate both high levels of goal achievement and ascription to the 
Presidency. With this in mind, we can assert that the EaP’s bilateral track was 
substantially (borderline highly) influenced by the agenda-shaping efforts of both the 
Polish and Lithuanian Council Presidencies. 
Brokering 
Whilst the role of the Presidency as a broker was used both to conclude the 
aforementioned bilateral visa facilitation agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia and 
to continue EU-Ukraine bilateral relations, the Polish Presidency significantly failed to 
shape bilateral relations with Belarus within the EaP framework in the way in which it 
would have liked. The ‘Declaration on the situation in Belarus’ of 30 September 2011 
criticised the state of human rights, democracy, rule of law, media freedom, political 
prisoners, and civil society in the country.57 The declaration was not, however, signed by 
the remaining five EaP countries alongside their EU counterparts, as had been the Polish 
Presidency’s intention.58 A common declaration of all participants would, according to 
a Polish EU Presidency representative, have helped to develop closer relations between 
the EU and the Eastern partners.59  A failure to broker such a deal, in spite of its excellent 
bilateral relations with these five remaining EaP countries, demonstrates the inability of a 
Presidency to influence a specific outcome when it faces a bloc of opposition. Goal 
achievement in this case is therefore none. The Polish Presidency’s brokering roles in 
maintaining bilateral EU-Ukraine relations (limited goal achievement and substantial 
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ascription, due to the supporting role played by senior EU officials and other EU Member 
States’ Foreign Ministers), and in concluding visa facilitation agreements with Azerbaijan 
and Armenia (high goal achievement and ascription) were both more successful.60 
Under the Lithuanian Presidency the Association Agreements with both Moldova and 
Georgia were initialled; a major development of the EaP’s bilateral track.61 Significant 
lobbying efforts on the part of the Lithuanian Presidency led to the initialling of the entire 
AA, rather than only the political part of the AA and the first and last pages of the 
DCFTA, as had been recommended initially by DG Trade.62 Thus, we can say that goal 
achievement was high and ascription to the Presidency substantial. Regarding the 
wording of the preamble of the Georgian AA, it was the Lithuanian Presidency-to-be 
rather than their Irish incumbents who negotiated an acceptable formulation; Georgia 
was recognised as “an Eastern European country”, which has potential repercussions 
surrounding a future Georgian EU membership application.63 As for the Lithuanians an 
ideal wording would have been “European country”, the level of goal achievement in 
this instance can only be described as substantial. We can, however, confidently 
ascribe this outcome to the Lithuanian Presidency-to-be, as it was Lithuanian officials 
who interacted with Georgian officials, using their close relations to find a solution to the 
complex and delicate issue, who sought a coalition with the Swedes to take the 
proposal to the EEAS, and who finally achieved unanimity among Member States.64 
The Lithuanian Presidency’s ability to broker deals was not, however, unlimited. 
Following Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s decision to suspend preparations for signing 
the Association Agreement at Vilnius, which was supposed to be the highlight of the EaP 
Summit, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė attempted to negotiate with 
Yanukovych both by telephone and in person on the eve of the summit itself, but to no 
avail. 65  Given the importance of the AA to both the EU and to the Lithuanian 
Presidency, the failure to broker a deal is significant and potentially demonstrates both 
the limitations of a ‘smaller state’ Presidency (though we can but speculate over 
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potential outcomes had Germany, for example, been in the driving seat), and also 
questions the preparation of the Presidency for such a possibility. Though the Lithuanian 
Presidency surely cannot be blamed for Yanukovych bowing to Russian pressure, they 
perhaps could have been better informed and therefore better placed to deal with 
such eventualities. Goal achievement in this case, therefore, is none.  
Interestingly, when it came to the influence of brokering in the bilateral track, both 
Poland and Lithuania suffered major setbacks: the former regarding the Declaration on 
the situation in Belarus, and the latter over the Ukrainian AA. That said, the way in which 
both Presidencies otherwise used brokering to successfully influence other outcomes 
means that the overall levels of influence are substantial (borderline limited).  
Multilateral track 
The multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership allows the EU and EaP countries to 
“tackle common challenges as a group”. 66  This track consists of flagship initiatives 
alongside four multilateral thematic platforms: (1) Democracy, good governance and 
stability; (2) Economic integration and convergence with European Union policies; (3) 
Energy security; and (4) Contacts between people.67 
Agenda-shaping 
The ability to shape the agenda of the EaP’s multilateral track during its Presidency was 
used to great effect by the Polish administration both in Warsaw and in Brussels. An 
overriding aim of the Polish Presidency was to use the sectoral policies chaired by the 
Council Presidency in the post-Lisbon era, rather than the HR/VP or EEAS officials, to 
broaden considerably the scope of the EaP’s multilateral dimension.68 Thus, the Polish 
Presidency took time to organise both an EU-EaP Transport Ministers’ conference in 
Kraków, as well as the first EaP Business Forum in Sopot.69 In the case of the former, the 
agenda-setting capabilities of the Polish Presidency were combined with an important 
brokering role whereby the Polish Minister of Infrastructure, Cezary Grabarczyk, played a 
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vital mediating role between the EU and his Azerbaijani counterpart.70 For the latter, the 
initial proposal came both before the Polish Presidency, in January 2010, and from the 
Working Group on Economic Integration and Convergence with the EU Policies rather 
than from a Polish official, meaning that ascription to the Presidency is substantial.71 
Nevertheless, for both the Transport Ministers’ conference and the Business Forum, the 
level of goal achievement for the Polish Presidency was high. We can assess, therefore, 
that agenda-shaping by the Polish Presidency was influential in the development of the 
Eastern Partnership’s multilateral track in this regard. 
Secondly, the Polish Presidency used agenda-shaping to develop the EaP’s multilateral 
track by establishing the European Endowment for Democracy (EED).72 Given that the 
EED was an initiative of Foreign Minister Sikorski, proposed to the HR/VP in January 2011, 
it was natural that Poland would look to develop this initiative during its Presidency.73 
Indeed, the agenda-setting capabilities of Ambassador Tombiński in COREPER meant 
that Poland was able to “put the issue on the agenda as often as was needed to reach 
unanimity on the idea”.74 Combined with an important brokering role, whereby the 
Polish Ambassador overcame concerns over funding, the sovereignty of partner 
countries, and overlap with existing instruments, the Polish Presidency was able to 
achieve an agreement in December 2011. 75 Goal achievement and ascription are 
therefore both high, with the agenda-setting roles of Foreign Minister Sikorski and 
Ambassador Tombiński of particular note. 
In addition to organising only the second ever EaP Business Forum, which produced a 
declaration ensuring the longevity of the project, Lithuania also used its agenda-setting 
capabilities to arrange the first joint EU-EaP Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Ministerial 
meeting and a joint EU-EaP Transport Ministerial meeting. 76 Regarding the former, this 
event was seen as vital for the Lithuanian administration given that they seek regular 
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JHA meetings to become an integral part of the EaP.77 This objective was achieved in 
the joint declaration.78 The meeting was significant as it gave EU Ministers and their EaP 
counterparts an opportunity to discuss the status of visa liberalisation agreements, which 
paved the way for significant progress to be made with Moldova at the 
aforementioned European Council meeting in December 2013. The declaration of the 
joint EU-EaP Ministerial meeting for transport spoke of the need to consolidate the 
development of the Regional Transport Network between the Eastern partners and to 
create a trans-European Transport Network, thus reflecting the objective of the 
Lithuanian Presidency.79 For all three of these events, we can comfortably assess that 
levels of goal achievement are high; Lithuania’s objectives were achieved throughout. 
Regarding ascription, it is necessary to note the influence of the Commission in the JHA 
and Transport meetings, as well as the business community and other EU Member States 
in the EaP Business Forum.80 Nevertheless, all three examples demonstrate the ability of 
the rotating Presidency to use agenda-shaping to influence the development of the 
EaP’s multilateral track; without Lithuania’s efforts to arrange such events and to push for 
ambitious goals, these achievements may not have been accomplished. 
Agenda-shaping in the multilateral track proved to be the most influential 
mechanism/track combination overall. Poland was consistently highly influential through 
its use of agenda-shaping, whilst Lithuania, through working with other Member States 
and EU institutions, had substantial-to-high influence in each of the three outcomes 
detailed above.  
Brokering 
In addition to the aforementioned brokering role for the Polish Presidency during the first 
EU-EaP Ministerial meeting for transport, where we can note high levels of both goal 
achievement and ascription for the Presidency, another important brokering role was 
during COEST meetings, despite the fact that in the post-Lisbon era this working party is 
permanently chaired by an EEAS official rather than by the rotating Presidency. 
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Whereas most Member States have one or a maximum of two representatives in COEST, 
the Polish Permanent Representation had three representatives for the duration of its 
Presidency.81 Consequently, when preparing the work for the main multilateral forum of 
the Eastern Partnership programme (the biennial summit), the Polish representatives 
were able to multiply contacts, conduct informal meetings with different Member States 
and EU officials simultaneously, and shape the direction of conversation in COEST 
meetings. 82  This numerical advantage, which was continued at the summit itself, 
allowed Poland to achieve as comprehensive a joint declaration as possible, as had 
been its intention.83 While ascription of the joint declaration to the Presidency can be 
assessed as limited-to-substantial at best, due to the number of other actors involved in 
the declaration formulation, we can nonetheless clearly see an influential role for the 
Presidency as a broker through the high level of goal achievement in this particular 
instance. 
Lithuania’s attempts to develop the multilateral track of the EaP through brokering were 
mostly executed with the support of other actors, such as the Commission, the EEAS, 
and other Member States, which, according to Thorhallsson and Wivel, is a common 
strategy of ‘small state’ Presidencies. 84  Over the six month period, deals were 
negotiated on multilateral (as well as bilateral) energy diversification, integration and 
security projects in order to develop the EaP’s third multilateral platform: energy 
security.85 Given the context of unstable EU-Ukraine-Russia relations and the divergence 
of relations between different EU Member States and Russia, such outcomes are 
impressive and the level of goal achievement is high.86 However, with lobbying and 
negotiation efforts led largely by DG Energy and EEAS officials – albeit supported primus 
inter pares by Lithuania alongside states such as Latvia, Estonia, the UK and Poland – 
ascription to the Presidency in this instance is limited. The first Eastern Partnership Youth 
Forum, held in Kaunas in October 2013, is another example of how Lithuania worked 
alongside other actors to make its mark on the EaP’s multilateral track. Sensing a certain 
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reluctance from some EU Member States to take part – perhaps due to the plethora of 
events that had been organised under the Polish Presidency – Lithuanian organisers of 
the Forum exerted considerable effort to achieve a high level of participation from 
across the EU. 87  Whilst Lithuania’s objective of hosting the first Youth Forum was 
achieved, given that eventually the forum lacked participation from Romania, Ireland, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Croatia, and only had two or fewer representatives from eight 
other EU Member States, we must assess goal achievement as limited-to-substantial.88 
Ascription to the Presidency is substantial rather than high as the majority of the 
organisers were from Lithuania, but a significant number were from partner countries 
and, more importantly, from the EU institutions.89 Nevertheless, both of these examples 
demonstrate the ability of the Lithuanian Presidency to use brokering as a means to 
develop the multilateral track of the EaP. 
Whilst not as highly influential as agenda-shaping, brokering as a means of influencing 
the multilateral track of the EaP proved an effective tool both for Lithuania and, in 
particular, for Poland, whose brokering influence was tempered only by significant input 
from other actors into the Declaration of the Second EaP Summit. As with agenda-
shaping in the multilateral track, Lithuania relied heavily on building alliances with other 
actors in order to achieve its objectives through brokering, and did so successfully. 
Internal track 
Though officially an ‘internal track’ of the Eastern Partnership does not exist, I consider 
the way in which actors within the European Union itself perceive the policy to be of 
significant importance. Such actors include the Commission, the EEAS and, perhaps 
most crucially, the Member States. Indeed, both academics and practitioners note the 
mixed reception received by the Eastern Partnership initiative among EU Member 
States,90 while both Šešelgytė and Delcour posit the need for a more even engagement 
across Member States for the EaP to become a truly EU-wide foreign policy.91 As such, 
this section will analyse the extent to which the Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies were 
able, through agenda-shaping and brokering, to influence the attitudes and increase 
the understanding of actors within the European Union towards the Eastern Partnership, 
and thus influence the development of the EaP’s so-called ‘internal track’. 
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The Polish Presidency used its agenda-shaping role to influence the internal track of the 
EaP through prioritising alternative dossiers important to those Member States with less of 
an inherent natural interest in the Eastern Partnership, such as the ‘Arab Spring’, the 
economic crisis, and the situation in Libya.92 Consequently, the Polish administration was 
able to build on improved relations with these Member States by encouraging them to 
pay more attention to similar issues in the Eastern neighbourhood, such as democracy, 
human rights, trade, development, drug-related crime, and judicial reform.93 The study 
on Polish influence in the Eastern Partnership by Vandecasteele et al. neglected, 
therefore, this important way in which the EaP was developed internally through 
significant attention to other issues. With the level of goal achievement as high, and 
ascription to the Presidency substantial (rather than high, as other actors were 
nonetheless proactive in dedicating agenda space to these alternative dossiers)94, we 
yet again see the importance of the pre-requisites for a Presidency to influence a policy 
priority. Firstly, it is clearly important for a Presidency to have several policy priorities, 
chosen carefully from across a range of issues, to be able to influence a particular 
policy of its choosing. By focussing on one policy and neglecting others, a Presidency 
risks alienating Member States and thus jeopardising potential progress elsewhere. 
Secondly, prudent planning is absolutely vital if a Presidency is going to be able to 
pursue its own priorities whilst at the same time adapting its schedule to deal with 
unforeseen circumstances that may arise. Unfortunately, and as alluded to in the 
previous section, the Polish Presidency’s proactive agenda-setting for the Eastern 
Partnership may at times have had a detrimental effect on the development of the 
EaP’s internal track. Whilst Poland’s enthusiasm for organising a vast number of events, 
meetings, conferences, and visits was influential in the development of the bi- and multi-
lateral tracks of the EaP, there was a feeling among several EEAS officials and the 
representatives of some Member States that a more targeted approach may have 
been preferable.95 In addition, the Polish Presidency perhaps could have adhered to 
pre-requisite one – accepting the reduced role for the Presidency in the post-Lisbon era 
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– as it was at times too forthcoming and forceful in its agenda-shaping, to the detriment 
of its relationships with certain EEAS and national officials.96  
The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry identified increased engagement across the EU’s 
Member States in the EaP as a specific priority of its Presidency. 97  Like the Polish 
Presidency, Lithuania assisted with the organisation of the biannual COEST excursions to 
increase interest and understanding of the EaP among the Member States and the 
EEAS.98 Not only did Lithuania cover some of the common costs and host a reception at 
the Lithuanian embassy in Chisinau under the Irish Presidency, it also played a key 
agenda-shaping role in arranging the COEST excursion to Ukraine during its own 
Presidency.99 Though the COEST excursions are formally arranged by EEAS officials, the 
Lithuanian administration used its excellent relations with the COEST chair and its 
privileged position as the Presidency to arrange for the Ukrainian government to invite 
the COEST, to persuade Member States to visit both Istanbul and Kiev (before Istanbul 
was dropped over domestic issues), and to lengthen certain parts of the trip to suit the 
programme Lithuania had envisaged.100 The Presidency’s role as an agenda-shaper 
was clearly highly influential in the development of the EaP’s internal track in this regard. 
Whereas for the COEST trip we can see high levels both of goal achievement and 
ascription to the Presidency, for the PSC trip the Lithuanians compromised on their initial 
objective of going solely to Georgia by visiting Moldova as well, and the agenda was 
shaped significantly by the PSC chair; thus, both levels are substantial rather than 
high.101 Notably, while the PSC excursion was acknowledged as “eye opening” and 
“worthwhile”, therefore meeting the Lithuanian objective of increasing understanding of 
the Eastern Partnership among EU participants, there was a certain unwillingness of 
some EEAS staff to recognise the important role of the Lithuanian Presidency in this 
development.102 Whereas the agenda-shaping role of the Lithuanian administration was 
welcomed in the COEST, PSC officials were more reluctant to ostensibly cede their 
agenda-shaping role to the Presidency, thus demonstrating that the importance of 
visibly accepting a reduced role for the Presidency varies between EU bodies. 
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The EaP’s internal track was substantially influenced by both Presidencies’ agenda-
shaping. The Lithuanian administration was perhaps slightly more successful than their 
Polish counterparts due to their ability to consistently work in a constructive and 
cooperative manner with EU officials, most notably those of the EEAS.  
Brokering 
The internal track of the Eastern Partnership was undoubtedly developed through Polish 
brokering efforts in Brussels, Warsaw, and other national capitals. Indeed, given that the 
EaP was conceived by the Polish Foreign Minister, it was a primary concern of the Polish 
Presidency that it would be viewed as having a hobbyhorse for the Eastern Partnership 
simply because of the policy’s domestic importance.103 Consequently, at every level of 
the decision-making process in Brussels the Polish Presidency was careful to explain how 
the development of the bilateral and multilateral tracks of the EaP would benefit the 
Union as a whole or individual Member States where appropriate. Every effort was 
made to engage in dialogue with all Member States, especially those that carried 
particular weight or held particular concerns that might have obstructed Poland’s 
Presidential priorities.104 At a national level, Poland used its considerable political weight 
and complex network of personal relations to conduct negotiations with individual 
Member States and also country groupings such as the Benelux Ministers, the Visegrád 
four, the Baltic three, and the Weimar Triangle group. 105  The arguments evoked 
depended on the country in question, and ranged from gaining leverage in talks with 
Russia, to increased energy security; from prospects for economic recovery through 
increased trade and investment, to altruism.106 This brokering role of the Presidency was 
crucial in making the whole European Union aware of the benefits of increased contact 
and better relations with the Eastern neighbours. We can assess, therefore, that the level 
of goal achievement was high, and that ascription to the Presidency was substantial, 
due in part to the active mediating role of the Commission and the EEAS.107 
Lithuania, like Poland before it, fully mobilised its diplomatic capacity during its 
Presidency to play a key mediating role with other EU Member States. According to the 
Lithuanian Ambassador to the Eastern Partnership, “the main thing was to show that the 
Eastern Partnership could be relevant for everyone. Maybe not the whole project but 
                                                 
103 Hahn-Fuhr and Lang, op.cit., p. 69; Interviews 8 and 15, op.cit. 
104 Interviews 8 and 15, op.cit. 
105 Interview 8, op.cit.; “The Visegrad Group and Germany Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the 
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certain aspects would be more interesting than others.”108 Whilst the Vilnius Summit may 
not have produced the signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the Summit 
was exceptionally well attended, which had been the objective of the Lithuanian 
administration. Not only were high levels of participation and representation across the 
EU important for the message being sent to Eastern partners, they were also important 
for the longevity of the Eastern Partnership.109 With only Ireland, Finland, and Portugal 
represented at a lower level than Head of State or Government, we must assess the 
level of goal achievement to be substantial-to-high, with the level of ascription of this 
achievement to the Presidency as substantial, given the input of other actors such as 
Commission, EEAS and other Member State officials to the eventual outcome.110  
Both Presidencies substantially influenced the development of the EaP’s internal track 
through brokering. Interestingly, Lithuania appears to have learned from Poland’s 
successful mobilisation of its diplomatic network to secure support and understanding 
for its objectives and initiatives in the EaP programme. 
Comparison and implications  
Table 2 summarises the findings for all three tracks, taking into account each individually 
illustrated outcome or development. 
Table 2: The influence of the Polish and Lithuanian rotating Council Presidencies in the 
Eastern Partnership 






Bilateral  Substantial (+) Substantial (-) Substantial (+) Substantial (-) 
Multilateral  High High Substantial (+) Substantial 
Internal  Substantial (-) Substantial (+) Substantial (+) Substantial (+) 
 
From this analysis we can come to the following conclusions: (1) that given the impact 
of agenda-shaping and brokering as residual, informal roles available to the post-Lisbon 
rotating Council Presidency, a lack of formal roles does not equate to a lack of 
influence; (2) the potential to use these residual roles requires: (a) an acceptance on 
                                                 
108 Interview 1, op.cit. 
109 “Vaidotas Verba: Eastern Partnership is not a geopolitical tool”, Mediamax, 18 July 2013; 
Interviews 1, 5-7 and 9, op.cit. 
110 Georgi Gotev, “Ukraine, EU dig in heels as Vilnius summit opens”, EurActiv, 29 November 2013. 
Adam Kaznowski 
26 
behalf of the Presidency that its role is primarily to support the new post-Lisbon actors in 
external action; (b) a careful choice of policy priority; and (c) thorough preparation for 
the Presidency; and (3) having sufficiently met these pre-requisites, the Polish and 
Lithuanian Presidencies were able to influence the development of the EaP through 
agenda-shaping and brokering. 
Despite these general conclusions, Table 2 in fact reveals few clearly observable 
patterns as to where or how a Presidency can have greater influence, despite 
demonstrating a clear substantial-to-high influence of both Presidencies overall. Neither 
agenda-shaping nor brokering was a more influential mechanism than the other, and 
indeed they were often used in tandem to achieve results, such as during Lithuania’s 
attempts to influence the outcomes of the COEST and PSC excursions during its 
Presidency. We also cannot differentiate between the bilateral and internal tracks; both 
were similarly influenced by the Presidencies. It is perhaps surprising that the two 
Presidencies enjoyed such influence in the internal track as fundamentally altering the 
perception of a fellow Member State or EU official vis-à-vis a specific policy in the space 
of six-months is presumably difficult. A substantial level of influence in the internal track 
tended to come as a result of high levels of goal achievement and lower levels of 
ascription to the Presidency. We must therefore assert that the Presidency can influence 
the development of the EaP’s internal track as successfully as it can the other two tracks 
if it engages with other actors in a coordinated and cooperative approach. That the 
multilateral track of the EaP was the most influenced by the two Presidencies, especially 
that of Poland, can perhaps be explained by the Presidency’s residual chairing 
responsibilities of sectoral issues, such as those included in the EaP’s thematic platforms 
or flagship initiatives, rather than in CFSP issues. 
The Polish Presidency was found to be highly influential on two occasions, through 
agenda-shaping and brokering in the multilateral track, compared to Lithuania’s none. 
However, it would appear that Lithuania received high levels of goal achievement in 
nine out of the thirteen individual outcomes illustrated. In contrast, all but three 
outcomes had a substantial or lower level of ascription to the Presidency. This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that the approach of the Polish Presidency is more 
advisable than that of Lithuania. On the contrary, lower levels of ascription to the 
Presidency, whilst in theory reducing its influence, may be more beneficial to the 
Presidency in the short- and long-term. In the first section of the paper, we noted that 
limited and substantial levels of ascription are the result of other actors playing an 
increasing role, at the expense of the role of the Presidency, in developing an 
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outcome.111 Subsequently, in the second part we noted the importance of the Member 
State holding the Presidency choosing a policy priority that has support from the EU 
institutions and among the Member States. As such, we can assess that Lithuania 
successfully adopted a cooperative and collaborative approach with other actors so as 
not to appear forceful or domineering.112 The Lithuanian Presidency, in contrast at times 
to their Polish counterparts, was considered to have worked very well with the EU 
institutions, especially the EEAS, and was admired among Member State officials for the 
way in which they actively consulted and engaged with them in achieving common 
objectives.113 An explanation for Lithuania’s tendency to cooperate and collaborate 
with others more so than Poland may be offered by the aforementioned debate 
surrounding ‘small states’ in the EU and their accompanying mentality.114 In the short-
term, Lithuania’s approach to its Presidency is said to have created a positive attitude 
from other actors towards their Presidential priorities, and in the long-term many predict 
that Lithuania will enjoy favourable relations with the EEAS and future Council 
Presidencies.115 Thus, we can say that while EU Member States have the potential to 
highly influence the development of a foreign policy priority during their Presidency, a 
more advisable approach may be to forgo high levels of ascription to the Presidency 
and instead achieve preferred outcomes through engaging with other actors. 
Recommendations and conclusion 
This paper has, through examining the influence of agenda-shaping and brokering on 
the development of the Eastern Partnership under the Polish and Lithuanian Council 
Presidencies, looked at whether the changes to the role of the rotating Presidency have 
impacted its ability to influence EU foreign policy. A Member State looking to pursue a 
foreign policy priority during its six months must, to this end, firstly accept the reduced 
role of the rotating Council Presidency in the post-Lisbon era so as to foster trust and 
enhance cooperation with the EU institutions, especially the EEAS. Secondly, the 
Member State holding the Presidency must target a range of policy priorities so as not to 
alienate other Member States, must ensure that its specific foreign policy priority enjoys 
the support of the EU institutions and a number of other Member States, and must 
present the foreign policy priority in such a way as to appear beneficial to the Union as 
a whole. Finally, thorough preparation enables a Member State to cope efficiently and 
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effectively with additional, unforeseen challenges that could otherwise drastically 
hinder the Presidency’s ability to pursue its own pre-determined priorities. Having met 
these three criteria, both the Polish and Lithuanian Presidencies were able to 
significantly influence the bilateral, multilateral and internal tracks of the EaP through 
agenda-shaping and brokering. A lack of formal roles does not, therefore, equate 
directly to a lack of influence for the Presidency, while a collaborative approach to 
pursuing common objectives is more advisable than an independent one. 
Though the above analysis is interesting from an academic viewpoint, it should also be 
of interest to national and European officials as they seek to make the most of the post-
Lisbon system. Based on the paper’s findings, four recommendations as to how the post-
Lisbon rotating Presidencies can best serve both Brussels and Member State 
governments will be detailed below. Firstly, changes to the role of the Presidency were 
made with the intention of bringing stability and continuity to EU foreign relations.116 As 
such, the Member States should recognise the added value of ‘uploading’ a domestic 
foreign policy priority to the European level.117 As noted by one EEAS official, one of the 
primary reasons for Poland and Sweden initiating the EaP at the European level was 
because politically a policy becomes much more credible and heavyweight if there are 
twenty-eight countries that stand behind it.118 Similarly, the administrative capacity of 
the EEAS allows the EaP to develop continuously at this higher European level, with 
certain rotating Presidencies bringing additional resources to build on the existing work 
carried out by the EEAS on a day-to-day basis.119 The long-term approach of the EEAS 
can therefore be complemented by the rotating Presidency’s short-term strategy.120 
Given that the Presidency rotates on a six-monthly basis, each new Presidency brings 
with it energy and enthusiasm, a desire to achieve visible outcomes, and fresh impetus 
to on-going processes.121 The EEAS should not fear the post-Lisbon rotating Presidencies; 
they can provide energy, drive, enthusiasm, and initiatives for six months at a time, 
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which is something that the EEAS is understandably not able to do every day. The 
rotating Presidencies, through their particular priorities, will ensure that the EEAS 
maintains a high level of ambition in its dossiers. 122 Indeed, the post-Lisbon EEAS-rotating 
Presidency relationship is one that allows for dossiers to be constantly maintained and 
gradually developed by the EEAS, thus ensuring continuity, with periodic increases in the 
speed or depth of the dossier when a Member State prioritises the issue for six months. 
Like an athletics relay, which requires a number of athletes to take the baton from start 
to finish, rotating Presidencies with a will to do so can carry the baton of the Eastern 
Partnership in a faster, more dynamic way that will benefit the overall outcome.123 Thus, 
the EEAS should acknowledge that a post-Lisbon rotating Presidency brings an energy 
that can help rather than hinder the development of a policy. 
Whilst the size of the EEAS has grown since being launched in December 2010, it remains 
the case that Member States possess a long history of relations with third countries that 
the EEAS, as of yet, does not. 124 Member States’ networks can be useful for the EEAS. 
The personal relations of the Polish President and Foreign Minister with their Ukrainian 
counterparts helped to maintain EU-Ukraine relations during the furore surrounding the 
arrest of Tymoshenko, whilst the relationship of mutual understanding between Lithuania 
and Georgia helped to find a solution to the wording in the preamble of its Association 
Agreement. Taking into account the diverse histories of EU Member States, where 
complex networks of relations stretch to Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Australia, and the 
Americas, and the credibility of Member States to speak on certain policy issues, there is 
a wealth of human knowledge and contact upon which the EEAS would do well to tap 
in to. In addition, the propensity of Member States to dedicate substantial financial 
resources to their Presidency should be a relief to the EEAS, which itself operates on a 
strict budget.125 Lithuania earmarked €62 million for its Presidency and Poland €100 
million, which are significant sums.126 This budget, as was the case for both Presidencies, 
can have significant benefits for the EEAS and for the policy priority that the Presidency 
wishes to promote. The EEAS should embrace the willingness of the rotating Presidencies 
to dedicate funds to activities, meetings or excursions that enhance the EU’s policies, 
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without feeling intimidated by their leadership. Unfortunately, despite the 
aforementioned benefits of a strong relationship between the EEAS and the Member 
State holding the rotating Presidency, it would appear that at times the relationship still 
struggles from feelings of mutual suspicion.127 Within the EEAS, the rotating Presidency is 
seen as a threat to their newly acquired areas of competence, whereas the Member 
States feel a mixture of resentment over the loss of pre-Lisbon, formal Presidency roles, 
distrust over the EEAS’ links to the Commission, and the threat of ‘competence creep’.128 
To remove mutual suspicion, the rotating Presidency and the EEAS must create a history 
of increased cooperation and collaboration. This can be achieved over time through 
increased dialogue, regular coordination meetings, working towards common 
objectives, and the secondment of national civil servants to Brussels. 129  Ultimately 
however, neither the rotating Presidency nor the EEAS “can hope to book meaningful 
successes without close cooperation with the other”.130 A good working relationship is 
therefore vital. 
In conclusion, the Treaty of Lisbon may have “replaced the role of the rotating 
Presidency with a new range of foreign policy actors”; however, one must go beyond a 
mere superficial reading of the treaties if we are to understand the real roles of the 
rotating Presidency in the post-Lisbon era. 131  The Polish and Lithuanian Council 
Presidencies are prime examples in this respect; both used agenda-shaping and 
brokering to influence the development of the Eastern Partnership during their 
respective six-months at the helm. Thus, one can say that they defied the logic of the 
Treaty; the rotating Council Presidency retains an important role in EU external affairs 
post-Lisbon. To what extent this level of influence can be replicated by other 
Presidencies in other foreign policy priorities remains to be seen and will, I hope, provide 
the basis for further research. 
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